

MARK SCHEME for the October/November 2012 series

9697 HISTORY

9697/31

Paper 3, maximum raw mark 100

This mark scheme is published as an aid to teachers and candidates, to indicate the requirements of the examination. It shows the basis on which Examiners were instructed to award marks. It does not indicate the details of the discussions that took place at an Examiners' meeting before marking began, which would have considered the acceptability of alternative answers.

Mark schemes should be read in conjunction with the question paper and the Principal Examiner Report for Teachers.

Cambridge will not enter into discussions about these mark schemes.

Cambridge is publishing the mark schemes for the October/November 2012 series for most IGCSE, GCE Advanced Level and Advanced Subsidiary Level components and some Ordinary Level components.

| | | |
|--------|--|----------|
| Page 2 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

GENERIC MARK BANDS FOR ESSAY QUESTIONS

Examiners will assess which Level of Response best reflects most of the answer. An answer will be required to demonstrate all of the descriptions in a particular Level to qualify for a Mark Band.

| Band | Marks | Levels of Response |
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| 1 | 21–25 | The approach will be consistently analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. Essays will be fully relevant. The argument will be structured coherently and supported by very appropriate factual material and ideas. The writing will be accurate. At the lower end of the band, there may be some weaker sections but the overall quality will show that the candidate is in control of the argument. The best answers must be awarded 25 marks. |
| 2 | 18–20 | Essays will be focused clearly on the demands of the question but there will be some unevenness. The approach will be mostly analytical or explanatory rather than descriptive or narrative. The answer will be mostly relevant. Most of the argument will be structured coherently and supported by largely accurate factual material. The impression will be that a good solid answer has been provided. |
| 3 | 16–17 | Essays will reflect a clear understanding of the question and a fair attempt to provide an argument and factual knowledge to answer it. The approach will contain analysis or explanation but there may be some heavily descriptive or narrative passages. The answer will be largely relevant. Essays will achieve a genuine argument but may lack balance and depth in factual knowledge. Most of the answer will be structured satisfactorily but some parts may lack full coherence. |
| 4 | 14–15 | Essays will indicate attempts to argue relevantly although often implicitly. The approach will depend more on some heavily descriptive or narrative passages than on analysis or explanation, which may be limited to introductions and conclusions. Factual material, sometimes very full, will be used to impart information or describe events rather than to address directly the requirements of the question. The structure of the argument could be organised more effectively. |
| 5 | 11–13 | Essays will offer some appropriate elements but there will be little attempt generally to link factual material to the requirements of the question. The approach will lack analysis and the quality of the description or narrative, although sufficiently accurate and relevant to the topic if not the particular question, will not be linked effectively to the argument. The structure will show weaknesses and the treatment of topics within the answer will be unbalanced. |
| 6 | 8–10 | Essays will not be properly focused on the requirements of the question. There may be many unsupported assertions and commentaries that lack sufficient factual support. The argument may be of limited relevance to the topic and there may be confusion about the implications of the question. |
| 7 | 0–7 | Essays will be characterised by significant irrelevance or arguments that do not begin to make significant points. The answers may be largely fragmentary and incoherent. |

| | | |
|--------|--|----------|
| Page 3 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

Section A

1 DAG HAMMARSKJOLD AS UN SECRETARY-GENERAL, 1953-61: ‘As Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold greatly enhanced the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. How far do Sources A-E support this view?’

L1 WRITES ABOUT THE HYPOTHESIS, NO VALID USE OF SOURCES [1–5]

These answers will write about Dag Hammarskjold and might use the sources. However, candidates will not use the sources as information/evidence to test the given hypothesis. If sources are used, it will be to support an essay-style answer to the question.

L2 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM THE SOURCES TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [6–8]

These answers use the sources as information rather than as evidence, i.e. sources are used at face value only with no evaluation/interpretation in context.

L3 USES INFORMATION TAKEN FROM SOURCES TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [9–13]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves both attempting to confirm and to disprove it. However, sources are still used only at face value.

L4 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE OR SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [14–16]

These answers are capable of using sources as evidence, i.e. demonstrating their utility in testing the hypothesis, by interpreting them in their historical context, i.e. not simply accepting them at their face value.

L5 BY INTERPRETING/EVALUATING SOURCES IN CONTEXT, FINDS EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE AND SUPPORT THE HYPOTHESIS [17–21]

These answers know that testing the hypothesis involves attempting both to confirm and disconfirm the hypothesis, and are capable of using sources as evidence to do this (i.e. both confirmation and disconfirmation are done at this level).

L6 AS L5, PLUS EITHER (a) EXPLAINS WHY EVIDENCE TO CHALLENGE/SUPPORT IS BETTER/PREFERRED, OR (b) RECONCILES/EXPLAINS PROBLEMS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT NEITHER CHALLENGE NOR SUPPORT IS TO BE PREFERRED [22–25]

For (a) the argument must be that the evidence for agreeing/disagreeing is better/preferred. This must involve a comparative judgement, i.e. not just why some evidence is better, but also why other evidence is worse.

For (b) include all L5 answers which use the evidence to **modify** the hypothesis (rather than simply seeking to support/contradict) in order to improve it.

| | | |
|--------|--|----------|
| Page 4 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

CONTEXT:

Dag Hammarskjold became Secretary-General of the UN in 1953 after the resignation of Trygve Lie, the Norwegian who had been forced out as a result of constant pressure by the Soviet Union, who accused him of being pro-USA (largely as a result of UN actions in Korea). With communism hardly represented in the UN except by the Soviet Union, it is unsurprising that the USSR felt isolated and believed that the UN had become a pro-Western organisation. Hammarskjold had seemed highly suited to the role of Secretary-General at such a contentious time – as a Swede, he represented his country's concept of neutrality; he had been one of the founders of Swedish Social Democracy (an ideological third way between capitalism and communism); he had been a senior civil servant – in the early years of the UN, the role of Secretary-General was seen as exactly that. However, he turned out to be rather more than the unobtrusive administrator which many had expected. Two issues had fundamentally changed the UN. Firstly, the onset of the Cold War had left the Security Council ineffective due to the Great Power's right of veto. Secondly, decolonisation led to the emergence of many new nations which became members of the UN. With the Security Council gridlocked and the General Assembly lacking real power, Hammarskjold extended the role of Secretary-General. This drew him into conflict with most of the Great Powers, eventually leading to a constitutional crisis in 1961, which threatened the very existence of the UN itself. Arguably, his tragic death in a plane crash on route to the Congo helped the UN to survive this problem, but left his successor (U Thant) with innumerable problems.

SOURCE A:

Context:

Soviet leader Khrushchev addressing the UN General Assembly in 1960, at the height of the Congo crisis. The Congo, trying to come to terms with its newly achieved independence, faced on-going problems from its former colonial masters (Belgium) and its own internal divisions. In effect, a civil war broke out, with the USA and USSR supporting opposing factions. Khrushchev was convinced that Hammarskjold was leading the UN into supporting the pro-USA faction, and hence this scathing attack on the Secretary-General's integrity.

Content (Face Value):

Khrushchev accuses Hammarskjold of being biased towards the USA and other Western countries and, therefore, prejudiced against the USSR. He sees events in the Congo as merely the latest example of this, and accuses Hammarskjold of being 'unjust' and supporting 'colonialism'. Accordingly, he calls on Hammarskjold to do the honourable thing, and resign. **(N – the prestige of the UN was bound to be adversely affected by claims that its Secretary-General was unjust and supporting colonialism. Moreover, the UN could not be effective if it was split).**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

Khrushchev accuses Hammarskjold of being biased in favour of the USA and Western countries, unjust and a supporter of colonialism (N). However, Soviet criticism of a UN Secretary-General was not new; the Soviets had effectively forced the resignation of Hammarskjold's predecessor over the Korean War issue. It was the USSR which had rendered the Security Council ineffective by excessive use of the veto in the UN's early years (the only reason that the USSR did not veto UN action in Korea was because her representatives were absent from the Security Council at the time in protest over the UN's failure to admit the PRC). As a communist country, the USSR felt isolated and vulnerable within the UN. Both the USA and USSR had established vested interests in the civil war which had broken out in the Congo; Khrushchev believed that Hammarskjold was favouring the American position. If Hammarskjold had resigned as Khrushchev wanted, it would effectively have been an admission of guilt. Hammarskjold did not resign, as he was still Secretary-General when he met his death in 1961 (X-Ref with B). This strongly suggests that Hammarskjold enjoyed the support of many members of the General Assembly (indeed, he was given a standing ovation when he responded to Khrushchev's speech by saying that he would remain in post as long as the General Assembly wanted him to). Further evidence to show that Hammarskjold must have enjoyed significant

| | | |
|--------|--|----------|
| Page 5 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

support in the General Assembly is the fact that, since a Secretary-General is elected for a five years, he must have been re-elected in 1958. Khrushchev's attack on Hammarskjold is *biased* and designed to intimidate the Secretary-General and shock the General Assembly (**N – but source is clearly biased and, therefore, unreliable**). However, it is evident from other sources that other countries also criticised Hammarskjold (*X-Ref with Source B, which states that the West also attacked him; Source C, which shows how the USSR, France and other Western countries broke relations with him; Source E, which shows that he incurred the wrath of the USSR, the USA and France*). (**N – Hammarskjold had poor relations with some of the Great Powers which comprised the Security Council – this was clearly divisive and would undermine the effectiveness and prestige of the UN**).

SOURCE B:

Context:

Speech by the Chairman of the Nobel Committee on the occasion of the posthumous award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Dag Hammarskjold in 1961. Hammarskjold had died earlier that year in a plane crash while on his way to promote a peaceful resolution of the Congo crisis.

Content (Face Value):

That Hammarskjold was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize suggests that his work was highly valued, and would bring greater prestige to the UN in the form of reflected glory. The speaker claims that Hammarskjold developed the UN into '*an effective and constructive international organisation*'. (**Y – Hammarskjold brought honour to the UN and turned it into an effective international organisation**).

Content (Beyond Face Value):

Hammarskjold's work is recognised by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, while the source speaks with great respect of what he achieved for the UN (**Y**). However, it is necessary to take the circumstances of the speech into account; at such an event, the speaker would inevitably highlight Hammarskjold's successes rather than his failures. Given that Hammarskjold died while engaged in UN activities designed to bring peace to the Congo, the award of the Peace Prize posthumously was both understandable and, arguably, inevitable. The source also shows how Hammarskjold was attacked by the West as well as the USSR (*X-Ref with Sources A, C and D*); this would cause divisions in the UN, especially the Security Council, which would not have helped either its prestige or the effectiveness. Indeed, the source states that charges against Hammarskjold '*took the form of an assault on the very idea of the UN organisation*', suggesting that Hammarskjold's actions could have led to the demise of the UN (*X-Ref with Source C*) (**N – Hammarskjold put the very existence of the UN in jeopardy**). The fact that Hammarskjold was criticised by both the West and the USSR would imply that Khrushchev was wrong to accuse him of bias towards the West (*X-Ref with Source A*). The source suggests that he was criticised because he fought for the independence of the UN against the attempts of the Great Powers to exert their influence. In this sense, he did help to enhance the effectiveness of the UN by maintaining its independence and refusing to allow Cold War rivalries to cloud his judgement or condition his actions (*X-Ref with Source D*) (**Y**).

| | | |
|--------|--|----------|
| Page 6 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

SOURCE C:

Context:

Written 20 years after Hammarskjold's death. While this a secondary source, it is written by someone who held high office in the UN and was directly involved at a very senior level in the events which took place while Hammarskjold was Secretary-General.

Content (Face Value):

The source states that there seems to be a widespread belief that Hammarskjold was both successful and highly popular with member states of the UN, especially those in the West. However, it says that these beliefs are wrong – Hammarskjold had a complete break in relations with the USSR and France, both members of the Security Council, and UN actions in the Congo led to major problems for the UN, which Hammarskjold's successor had to deal with. While he did help governments get out of difficult situations (e.g. Suez, Lebanon), he was generally disliked even by Western governments. **(N – he was not popular with both the USSR and Western governments, whilst his actions in the Congo led to a major constitutional crisis in the UN).**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

At face value, the source is critical of Hammarskjold due to his poor relations with members of the UN Security Council from both the East and the West (*X-Ref with Source A, which claims that Hammarskjold was biased towards the West and against the USSR, Source B which states that he was attacked by West and East, and Source E which states that he was in conflict with the USSR, USA and France*). UN actions in the Congo, which Hammarskjold led, created a constitutional crisis for the UN (*X-Ref with Source B*). **(N)**. The source is written by someone who worked closely with Hammarskjold, and therefore would have known him and the situations he faced intimately. While this gives the source added weight, it remains the personal opinion of one man, who might have had reasons for being critical of his former 'boss'. The source makes it clear that widespread opinion seems to rate Hammarskjold highly – a 'superman' able to make problems disappear as if by magic, and highly popular with Western governments. Urquhart is trying to show that this is not the case, and that Hammarskjold faced insoluble problems, *'much as his successors have had to'*. Poor relations with member states, from both East and West, were caused by his *'single-minded internationalism and integrity'* - i.e. his determination to ensure that the UN was independent and that its decisions were not affected by the vested interests of the Big Powers (*X-Ref with Sources B and D*). Maintaining its independence from the Great Powers was essential to ensure the continued effectiveness of the UN, and the source gives two examples (Suez and Lebanon) wherein Hammarskjold was successful in resolving. Maintaining UN independence from the Great Powers would have been popular with the new, non-aligned nations (*X-Ref with Source E*). **(Y – Hammarskjold was successful in maintaining the independence of the UN and in certain events such as Suez and Lebanon. Arguably, this would have enhanced the UN's effectiveness and prestige, at least with non-aligned states, and perhaps explains why popular opinion of Hammarskjold is so positive).**

| | | |
|--------|--|----------|
| Page 7 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

SOURCE D:

Context:

Secondary source by an Egyptian academic in 2005.

Content (Face Value):

The source is full of praise for Hammarskjold. He kept the UN independent from narrow national interests, enhanced the role of the Secretary-General and created the notion of peacekeeping. In doing so, he developed the shape of the modern UN and made it *'the indispensable actor in global conflict resolution'*. **(Y – Hammarskjold's revolutionary reforms clearly enhanced the prestige and effectiveness of the UN).**

Content (Beyond Face Value):

Secondary source – the writer has access to information and evidence on which to judge the effects of Hammarskjold's actions in hindsight. The source states that Hammarskjold maintained the UN's independence from the vested interests of nation-states, and especially the Great Powers, which explains why he came into conflict with them as they would have resented his attitude (*X-Ref with Sources B and C*). The source states that Hammarskjold developed a new form of *'preventive diplomacy'*, which emerged into UN Peacekeeping (*X-Ref with Source E*), and developed the role of the Secretary-General, which was necessary because the Security Council was gridlocked by the Cold War and the General Assembly was weak (*X-Ref with Source E*). As an Egyptian, the writer would clearly know about Hammarskjold's work in the Suez Crisis, which led to the development of UNEF, a peacekeeping force which maintained peace between Egypt and Israel for ten years. The writer claims that Hammarskjold created the shape of the modern UN and made it *'the indispensable actor in global conflict resolution'*. **(Y – Hammarskjold's revolutionary reforms clearly enhanced the prestige and effectiveness of the UN).** However, the title of the article makes it obvious that it is likely to concentrate on the positive aspects of Hammarskjold's role as UN Secretary-General. No mention is made of the fact that Hammarskjold's relations with the Great Powers were not always good (*X-Ref with Sources B and C*), that Khrushchev accused him of bias and urged him to resign (*X-Ref with Source A*) or that he caused a constitutional crisis which threatened the existence of the UN (*X-Ref with Source C*). **(Y, but a rather unbalanced account).**

SOURCE E:

Context:

Secondary source by a British historian, 2005.

Content (Face Value): The source claims that Hammarskjold changed the UN to cater for changes which had occurred in the global situation since the original Charter was drawn up – i.e. gridlock in the Security Council due to the Cold War and Great Power veto, and decolonisation, which brought a large number of new states into the UN, each with particular problems and many of whom were threatened in some way by the globalisation of the Cold War. The writer shows how Hammarskjold addressed these problems by enhancing the role of the Secretary-General and creating a new way of working for the UN. The source claims that this was Hammarskjold's *'genius'*. **(Y – Hammarskjold developed the UN to cater for new situations in the world, thus enhancing its prestige and effectiveness).**

Content (Beyond Face Value): As a historian writing in 2005, the writer would have access to a range of evidence on which to base his judgement of Hammarskjold. The use of the word *'genius'* implies a positive view of Hammarskjold's achievements. The author claims that Hammarskjold adapted the UN to fit the changing world conditions (Y). However, in doing so, Hammarskjold came into conflict with the Great Powers from both West and East (*X-Ref with Sources A, B and C*) – as Source C claims, this would have been a *'great impediment for a Secretary-General, who must be able to deal constructively with member governments and especially with the permanent members of*

| | | |
|--------|--|----------|
| Page 8 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

the Security Council' (X-Ref with Source C). The source does not claim that Hammarskjold introduced the new methods for the UN, merely that he was able to 'articulate' it effectively (N – Hammarskjold had poor relations with at least some of the Great Powers, which would clearly hinder the prestige and effectiveness). Nevertheless, it could be argued that Hammarskjold had little choice but to enhance the role of the Secretary-General; it was this which inevitably led to rivalry with the Great Powers, which saw the Security Council (originally envisaged as the 'power house' of the UN) being by-passed. The fact that Hammarskjold was criticised by governments from both West and East suggests that Khrushchev was wrong to accuse him of bias (X-Ref with Source A). Indeed, Hammarskjold's main support came from the new member states, effectively the non-aligned group, who viewed the UN as vital in keeping their countries out of the Cold War rivalry – it was they who gave him a standing ovation when he refused to resign following Khrushchev's speech, stating that he would remain as long as 'they' (i.e. the General Assembly and the non-aligned states) wanted him to. The new way of working involved peacekeeping, which has become the standard method of UN actions to maintain peace and security in the world (X-Ref with Source D). (Y – Hammarskjold enhanced the role of the Secretary-General in order to enable the UN to overcome the ineffectiveness of the Security Council and the problems associated with decolonisation. This enhanced both the prestige and effectiveness of the UN in ways never envisaged in 1945).

CONCLUSION

Since his death in 1961, Hammarskjold has been held in high esteem; indeed, many of his successors have had to cope with unfavourable comparisons. This is reflected in Sources D and E. During his tenure of the Secretary-Generalship, however, he was criticised by most of the Great Powers; whilst Khrushchev's criticisms can be explained by the USSR's on-going resentment at what it saw as the pro-Western nature of the UN, criticisms from Western Great Powers reveal their annoyance at Hammarskjold's insistence on enhancing the power of the S-G at their expense. As Source B explains, criticism of him only ended with his death. The fact that he died while on a UN mission to establish peace enhanced his reputation as a man of peace and integrity, but this belies the fact that he left the Congo crisis in a mess. In one sense, he created a constitutional crisis which could have threatened the existence of the UN. On the other hand, he gave the UN a new direction, enabling it to cope with the ineffectiveness of the Security Council and the effects of decolonisation (and the increasing membership of the UN).

| | | |
|--------|--|----------|
| Page 9 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

Section B

2 'The USSR did not seek a breakdown in relations with the USA from 1945 to 1949.' How far do you agree?

Candidates may refer to the historical debate regarding the causes of the Cold War. In support of the hypothesis, candidates might refer to the 'revisionist' view that it was Truman's inexperience and strongly anti-communist views which caused the Cold War. While Stalin's actions can largely be explained by the USSR's need for security and reluctance to permit the re-growth of Germany, Truman's actions are less easy to explain. Truman's deployment of the atomic bomb in Japan, without prior consultation with the USSR, the ending of Lend-Lease, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan could all be seen to have motives extending beyond the containment of communism – eg 'dollar imperialism'. Candidates might also refer to the 'post-revisionist' view that the Cold War was caused by misunderstandings between the super powers (e.g. the USA failing to understand the USSR's need for security from Western Europe; the USSR's failure to understand the USA's motives in wanting to secure a strong Germany).

In challenging the hypothesis, candidates might refer to the 'traditional' viewpoint. Stalin's open statements regarding communist revolution, his breaking of the Potsdam promises, his actions in Eastern Europe, the Berlin Blockade etc. The USA saw these events as clear evidence of Soviet expansionism, which needed to be checked by initiatives such as the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

3 To what extent, in the period from 1950 to 1980, did the superpowers globalise the Cold War by deliberately exploiting regional conflicts?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that the superpowers had their own motives for becoming involved in such conflicts and needed little encouragement. The USSR had a vested interest in encouraging communist revolution, especially if this could be achieved without direct Soviet involvement (as in Korea, for example). The USSR did not support Castro merely to offer help to a new and vulnerable communist state, but also for strategic and prestige reasons. The USA was determined to defend and extend its economic power, and this meant protecting vital areas such as Japan, which forced the USA to become involved in Southeast Asia. The Middle East, with its vast oil supplies, was economically and strategically vital for both the USSR and the USA, while the security of the PRC was threatened by US action in both Korea and Vietnam. Decolonisation in Africa offered potential for superpower exploitation of expensive resources, while the power of the USA and the USSR within the UN depended on securing the support of the newly independent members.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that the globalisation of the Cold War was characterised by a series of regional conflicts, often the outcome of decolonisation, into which the superpowers became reluctantly embroiled for strategic, diplomatic, security or prestige reasons. In Korea, Kim Il Sung ensured that he had the approval of both the USSR and the PRC before invading of South Korea. Similarly, in Cuba, Castro turned to the USSR for both economic and military support to protect his revolution from the USA, just as Batista had relied on American support to maintain his dictatorship. South Vietnamese leaders relied on US support to maintain their dictatorships, while Ho Chi Minh knew that the PRC and the USSR would never tolerate a defeat for North Vietnam. In the Middle East, Nasser (Egypt) was emboldened to go to war against Israel in 1967 by Soviet encouragement, while Israel enjoyed the support of the USA. In Africa, regional problems were often made worse by the involvement of the superpowers; e.g. in the Congo, where both factions were only too keen to exploit superpower support.

| | | |
|---------|--|----------|
| Page 10 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

4 'American foreign policy proved highly successful in the Korean War.' How far do you agree?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that American foreign policy was based on the concept of containing communism – i.e. preventing it from spreading and threatening American interests. Although not originally in the US defence perimeter, if South Korea had fallen to the communists, this would have created a further threat to the whole of SE Asia, and threatened US economic interests in Japan. Given that the original aim was to remove communism from South Korea, American policy and actions were successful. Moreover, American actions were both endorsed and militarily supported by the UN.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that, since Korea was not in the USA's original defence perimeter (a factor which led Stalin to give Kim permission to attack South Korea), the USA's subsequent involvement was a hasty and ill-conceived departure from or extension of US foreign policy – a knee-jerk reaction to the fact that China had become communist in 1949. In pre-empting the UN's deliberations, the USA forced the UN's hand, a factor which led to constitutional crises within the UN (with the USSR claiming that it was a tool of the USA). While Kim's invasion was repelled and communism was contained in North Korea, the USA's deployment of 'roll back' by attacking North Korea had not only failed but also led to the involvement of the PRC. American foreign policy was disjointed and, in many ways, ineffective during the Korean War.

5 To what extent was the crisis of Chinese communism in the late 1980s a consequence of Deng Xiaoping's determination to reform too much?

In support of the hypothesis, it could be argued that Deng's determination to develop 'market socialism' led to economic and social reforms (e.g. joining IBM and WB, profit-sharing schemes, greater religious freedoms, Democracy Wall), which in turn led to demands for more radical reform (e.g. student demonstrations in 1986 supporting Deng's 'Four Modernisations' but also demanding greater democracy). Traditional, conservative members of the CCP were disaffected by this factor, which culminated in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989.

In challenging the hypothesis, it could be argued that Deng insisted throughout on the maintenance of one-party control. Unlike Gorbachev he believed that it was possible to have socio-economic reform without political reform. By carefully balancing the various factions within the CCP, he was able to maintain control. The fact that the CCP maintained control of the army, together with Deng's refusal to bow to international criticism, was essential in maintaining the CCP's control. It was, therefore, Deng's resistance to political reform which led to the Tiananmen Square incident and the threat to the CCP's survival.

6 Consider the view that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 achieved nothing substantial.

It is necessary to establish 'success criteria' - in this case, the fairest criteria would appear to be the original aims and terms of the Treaty itself.

In support of the view that the Treaty achieved nothing substantial, it could be argued that some countries refused to sign (e.g. India, Pakistan, Israel), others have subsequently withdrawn (e.g. North Korea), while others have been found in non-compliance (e.g. Iran, Libya). Verification of compliance by the International Atomic Energy Agency has been largely ineffective. The USA has been accused of breaking the ethos if not the terms of the Treaty (e.g. deploying nuclear weapons in non-nuclear NATO states such as Belgium). The Non-Aligned Movement has stated that non-proliferation cannot be sustained without 'tangible progress in disarmament', of which there was precious little before 1991. Nasser argued that *'basically they did whatever they wanted to do before the NPT and then devised it to prevent others from doing that they themselves have been doing before'*.

| | | |
|---------|--|----------|
| Page 11 | Mark Scheme | Syllabus |
| | GCE AS/A LEVEL – October/November 2012 | 9697 |

In challenging the view that the Treaty achieved nothing substantial it could be argued that despite the original intention that the NPT should last for 25 years, it is still in force and the number of states with nuclear weapons remains relatively small (China and France added in 1992). Only four recognised states are not party to the NPT. Several NPT signatories have given up nuclear weapon programmes (e.g. South Africa). Several former Soviet Republics destroyed or transferred nuclear weapons to Russia on the demise of the USSR. Much of the criticism of the NPT centres on the fact that nuclear weapons continued to exist in abundance; this is unfair, since the major aim of the Treaty was to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

7 'Japan's economic miracle was entirely dependent on favourable external factors.' How far do you agree?

Arguments which support the hypothesis are likely to include - support from the USA, which saw Japan as a bulwark against communism in Southeast Asia; favourable trading arrangements with USA; with USA providing security, Japan could concentrate on industrial investment; Korean War provided enhanced markets for Japanese products; the fact that much of Japan's industry had been destroyed in WWII meant that it could rebuild with modern, high-tech equipment. Arguments which challenge the hypothesis might include the fact that the Liberal Democratic Party provided stable government throughout the period from 1952 to 1993. Conservative in nature, it encouraged business practice, reformed land ownership and encouraged investment in industry. Government initiatives included a scheme in 1960 aimed at doubling incomes within ten years.

8 Analyse the developing significance of OPEC from 1960 to 1991.

Founded at the Baghdad Conference in 1960, OPEC was a cartel aiming to limit oil supplies in the hope of keeping prices high. In the 1960s, OPEC was not able to achieve this because it had only 28% of the world's oil output, oil reserves belonged to multi-national companies, there was an oil glut and there were political divisions within the Arab world. Rise in the 1970s was due to the fact that rising demand for oil began to outstrip supply. OPEC members reached new agreements with multi-national companies, which led to rise in oil prices. Arab states used oil as a political weapon during the 1970s war between Egypt and Israel; this increased the prices of oil still further. Prices rose from \$3 a barrel to \$11.65. Which led to a deep recession in the world economy. The Second Oil Shock followed the Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq war; by 1980s prices had risen to \$36 a barrel. However, the impact of the Second Oil Shock was short-lived. Production by non-OPEC countries (e.g. Mexico, Britain, Norway) continued to increase and OPEC's share of world output fell by 27%. OPEC's largest producer, Saudi Arabia, saw its oil revenues drop from \$113.2 billion in 1981 to \$20 billion in 1986. OPEC had a stark choice – cut prices to regain markets or cut production to maintain price. OPEC did not want to cut prices for fear that this would undermine their whole pricing structure and destroy the economic and political gains they had made. However, OPEC members did not show a united front – e.g. Saudi Arabia chose to reduce prices to regain market share.