Cambridge Assessment International Education

Cambridge International AS & A Level

HISTORY **9389/33**

Paper 3 Interpretations Question **May/June 2020**

1 hour

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You must answer on the enclosed answer booklet.

You will need: Answer booklet (enclosed)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Answer **one** question from **one** section only.
  - Section A: Topic 1 The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939
  - Section B: Topic 2 The Holocaust
  - Section C: Topic 3 The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950
- Follow the instructions on the front cover of the answer booklet. If you need additional answer paper, ask the invigilator for a continuation booklet.

INFORMATION

- The total mark for this paper is 40.
- The number of marks for each question or part question is shown in brackets [ ].

This document has **4** pages. Blank pages are indicated.

Section A: Topic 1

The Causes and Impact of British Imperialism, c.1850–1939

1 Read the extract and then answer the question.

By the 1870s much of Africa was still mysterious. No explorer had penetrated far along the Equator towards the interior. Europeans pictured most of the continent as 'vacant', a no-man's land. If there were states and rulers, they were African. But beyond the trading posts on the coastal fringe, and strategically important colonies in Algeria and South Africa, Europe saw no reason to intervene.

In May 1873 David Livingstone, the celebrated missionary explorer, died in Ilala, in the unknown heart of Africa, and his sun-dried body was brought home to be buried in London. From his brass-plated tomb, Livingstone's legacy produced a call for a worldwide crusade to open up Africa. A new slave trade, organised by Swahili and Arabs in East Africa, was eating out the heart of the continent. Livingstone's answer had been the '3 Cs': Commerce, Christianity and Civilisation, a triple alliance of capitalism. God and social progress. Trade, not the gun, would liberate Africa. The freelance promoters of the partition – the men who followed Livingstone out to Africa and scrambled greedily for their share – are now half-forgotten. In their day they were famous (and infamous), celebrated as heroes, denounced as brutes or hypocrites. Each responded to Livingstone's call in their own fashion. But they all thought of the crusade in terms of romantic nationalism. Most of them were outsiders of one kind or another, but no less passionate nationalists for that. To imperialism – a kind of 'race patriotism' – they brought a missionary zeal. Not only would they save Africa from itself, Africa would be the saving of their own countries.

At first European governments were reluctant to intervene. But to most people in their electorates, there seemed a real danger of missing something. Africa offered the chance of glittering prizes. There were dreams of El Dorado, of diamond mines and goldfields criss-crossing the Sahara. In Europe these were the drab years of Depression and mounting stocks of Manchester cotton. Perhaps Africa was the answer to the merchant's prayers. There might be new markets out there in this garden of Eden, and tropical orchards where the golden fruit could be plucked by willing African hands.

In Britain, the Scramble was taken calmly – at first. Then there was growing resentment towards the intruders. Britain had pioneered the exploration and evangelisation of Central Africa, and felt a sense of ownership in most of the continent. Besides, there was a vital interest at stake for Britain. As the only great maritime empire, it needed to prevent its rivals obstructing the steamer routes to the East, via Suez and the Cape. That meant digging in at both ends of Africa. And it was in Protestant Britain, where God and capitalism seemed made for each other, that Livingstone's words struck the deepest chord. The '3 Cs' would redeem Africa.

That was not the way Africans perceived the Scramble. There was a fourth 'C' – Conquest – and it gradually dominated. At first European expeditions were too weak to challenge African rulers. It was safer to use blank treaty forms, explained away by empire-minded missionaries, than to use live ammunition. But paper imperialism soon proved inadequate. When effective occupation became necessary to establish control, conflict became inevitable. Soon the maxim gun, not trade or the cross, became the symbol of the age. Most of the battles were cruelly one-sided. At Omdurman, British officers counted 10 000 Sudanese dead or dying in the sand. They made no effort to help the 15 000 wounded. Europe had imposed its will on Africa at the point of a gun.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the British Empire to explain your answer. [40]

Section B: Topic 2

The Holocaust

2 Read the extract and then answer the question.

There is a recent tendency to claim that anti-Semitism does not explain the Holocaust. In my view, this is completely misleading. No one claims that there is a straight line from traditional anti-Semitism to its Nazi form, nor does the background to the Nazi murder project consist only of anti-Semitism. But the disconnection between the two raises a very simple question: if there is no connection between anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, why, then, did the Nazis murder Jews and not bicycle riders? There is, quite clearly, both a strong element of continuity and also something new of a nationalist-racist character in Nazi anti-Semitism. Against a background of crisis in Western society, and the specific impact of these crises on German society, anti-Semitism was the central motivation that drove the Nazis to murder the Jews. They could do it, not necessarily because of the identification of German society with murderous anti-Semitism, which was the programme of the governing elite, but because of the identification with the regime as such by vast masses of the German people. To argue for a disconnection between anti-Semitism and the Holocaust makes absolutely no sense at all.

However, if we want to answer the question of why the Holocaust happened, there are a number of important preliminary issues to be addressed. We are still battling with the definition of the very subject we are dealing with. Let us be clear: the Holocaust, Shoah, Churban, Judeocide, whatever we call it, is the name we give to the planned annihilation of the Jewish people, and its partial perpetration with the murder of most of the Jews of Europe. The problem of whether this is unique is still a topic of sharp disagreement, and I have stated my position often: to me, the uniqueness lies in the motivation of the murderer, the quest for an annihilation that sentenced all people born of three or four Jewish grandparents to death for the crime of having been born, for purely illusionary, ideological, abstract reasons, to do away with a mythical, non-existent Jewish world conspiracy.

A theory is being offered that as the Nazi policy of murder of German mental and other patients, the murder of many Gypsies, and the murder of the Jews were all based on so-called racial, that is hereditary or genetic principles, they are all part of the Holocaust. But Nazi policy towards Italians, Romanians and Japanese was also based on racist principles, and I would suggest that there is a world of difference between problems that the Nazis had with the 'purity' of their own 'race' and the social irritant that they saw in the Roma people, on the one hand, and the universal threat to Nazi humankind they saw in the Jews. The attitude to Jews was a central pillar of Nazi ideology and it could, in the end, be solved only by total murder. Attitudes to the Gypsies were not a central part of Nazi ideology, and to the best of my knowledge there never was a plan to murder all Gypsies. The T4 programme of murder of the handicapped was a derivative of internal German-Nazi concerns. To see these issues as the same is, I think, to confuse them. It does not do any service to the Roma people to mix them up in the same analytical framework with the Jews by defining the Holocaust as including both. The suffering of each Gypsy was exactly the same as the suffering of a Jew, a Pole, or anyone else. But the motivation of the perpetrator was different.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Holocaust to explain your answer. [40]

Section C: Topic 3

The Origins and Development of the Cold War, 1941–1950

3 Read the extract and then answer the question.

If the occasion was solemn, it was rendered even more so by the fact that Secretary of State Marshall – himself a solemn and dignified person – was about to deliver an important message to the country and the world. In it, he would paint a bleak picture of Europe's economic conditions and would announce that the United States might be prepared to assist the European nations 'in a return to normal economic health'. But the initiative for drawing up such a programme, he would go on to state, must come from Europe, and the programme itself 'should be a joint one, agreed to by a number of, if not all, European nations'. Yet even as Marshall rose to the podium at Harvard University on 5 June 1947, the delivery process by which the Marshall Plan was brought into the world had already been under way for some time.

Historians have offered us a choice of alternatives in dating the conceptual origins of the Marshall Plan and in identifying those who initially formulated the basic ideas contained in Marshall's speech. For example, we are told that well before the end of 1946, some State Department officials had already recognised the seriousness of Europe's economic difficulties and were giving careful consideration to the creation of a European recovery plan. However, the exact point at which the decision-making process leading directly to Marshall's speech began to take shape cannot, even now, be clearly determined. According to some, the crucial moment came on 21 February 1947, the day the US was officially informed of Great Britain's inability to continue its military and economic aid to Greece. Others have claimed that it was the frustrating experience of the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference (10 March–24 April 1947) that prompted Secretary Marshall to instruct his staff to study the problems of European reconstruction and prepare a plan for action. But if a precise moment or a single individual responsible for starting the process cannot be identified, the overriding consideration behind the US offer to help Europe can be clearly stated. It was the rapid deterioration of Europe's economies during the severe winter of 1947 and the American perceptions of the consequences of a West European economic collapse.

To say this is, however, to gloss over a number of complex economic and political factors that confronted US policy makers during the first half of 1947 and helped influence their eventual response. First, there was the problem of the deterioration of US–Soviet relations and the threat – real or imagined – of further communist expansion in Europe. Second, Britain faced serious economic difficulties which raised political-strategic implications. Third, Germany was experiencing economic stagnation and the US perceived a need to revive her industries. Fourth, most West European countries were struggling with internal economic dislocations. Fifth, there were forecasts early in 1947 of a coming US recession and a concern that Europe's lack of money, with which to purchase US exports, would further aggravate the decline in demand. Sixth, many believed that continuing difficulties in Europe would hinder healthy and unrestricted international trade relationships, with long-term adverse consequences for the US economy. Finally, there was the hope that an improvement in Europe's economic health would promote political stability and lasting peace. All of these, in varying degrees, contributed to the essence of Marshall's message. The suggested undertaking was to be at once a political and an economic effort – an effort aimed at advancing US foreign policy interests by enabling European countries to pursue specific economic objectives.

What can you learn from this extract about the interpretation and approach of the historian who wrote it? Use the extract and your knowledge of the Cold War to explain your answer. [40]